Monday, October 19, 2015

The Philosophical Underpinnings of Truth and Idealist Deconstructionism

(This blog post is to establish the philosophy, not to analyze the novel. That is another blog post.)

    Cogito ergo sum; audi alteram partem. The solipsistic perception implied by cogito ergo sum, or “I think, therefore I am”, inures an uncertainty of reality. The mind-body problem, that is, the unclear relationship between mental processes and reality, so often assailed by philosophers, flourishes in this uncertainty. Contoured by this preposition is a contradiction between the society and the individual: in the individual arises a singular truth in perception (everything he/she thinks “is”); the society proposes, therein, millions of minds and therefore millions of potential realities. Speaking in generalities, the candor within society is commonly viewed to be undermined by misalignments of a singular truth—that a violation of a singular truth in all things is a lie, and therefore there is unity in truth. Despite the intuitive reason gleaned by said preposition, it does not provide in all situations. The intent of this essay is to firstly establish principles of truth, multiple solutions held by classical logic to the liar paradox, solutions to the diallelus such as Plato’s theory of forms, and synthesize said ideals into a functional, prismatic view of truth (which is thereby applicable to the world of Toni Morrison). 

    Despite the intuitive reason gleaned by the preposition of a singular truth, it does not provide in situations that attempt to equate morality to truth, particularly the liar paradox. The liar paradox is the paradoxical statement “I am lying”, in which he/she confesses to having lied, and is therefore telling the truth, which means he/she is lying. This statement’s paradoxical character is ascertained by classical logic’s common law of noncontradiction, in which statements cannot be true simultaneously; although the law of noncontradiction can disallow simultaneous existence, purported realities can still exist, and thereby validate the opinion of singular truth (they are simply mutually exclusive). To completely disavow it, then, the principle of explosion (that is intertwined with the law of contradiction) can be used. The principle of explosion asserts any preposition to be inferable based off a direct contradiction. Furthermore, it is obvious that not all things are true, and therefore validation obtained by the law of noncontradiction is devoid of meaning.

   The ambivalence toward truth culminates in the diallelus (regress argument), which asserts that any preposition stipulates a justification, which in turn requires a justification, thereby leading to an infinitely questioned statement. The trifecta of results read (1) infinitism, in which the regress continues indefinitely, (2) foundationalism, which postulates axioms and bases as the answer to all exterior prepositions, and (3) coherentism, a claim that prepositional regress continues circularly. Coherentism arguably converges toward a set of prepositions (coherence theory of truth).
Plato’s implied solution to the infinite regress problem is through his proposed belief system: “idealism”. Through the Allegory of the Cave, Plato “solved” the previous Gettier problem, and proposed his Theory of Forms, an integral concept to Idealism. The Allegory of the Cave is an allegorical representation of knowledge through the arduous experience of prisoners within a cave, who firstly observe distorted shadows, and are then liberated. In this dialectic, Plato supposes the prisoners to, upon realizing the “light”, to yearn to return to darkness—implicitly, their reality was not entirely untrue, but more so diluted. If a prisoner were to be “cured of their error”, Plato speculates his liberation to be agonizing, compelled by curiosity yet hindered by the distressing “glare”. He would be “unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows”. He would suspect his previous diluted reality to be “far truer” than his current sensory perception. Plato may implicate a sense of subjectivity to truth, or perhaps greater truths of humanity: that ‘truth’ is overbearing, and even unveiled reality may be incomprehensible once one is trained in ignorance. 

   Regardless, the disagreement between “ideas” of perception and “real” perception founds the belief system of Idealism, or Plato’s Theory of Forms, and justified true belief. Plato’s Theory of Forms asserts objects to be, in any extent, lesser representations of the ‘idea’ they represent. Diverges of Idealism can be seen to specify this interpretation: espitemological idealism asserts reality to only be known through ideas; transcendental idealism asserts perception is similar to these ideas, and is subject-based. Although inherently disagreeable by all principles of empiricism, idealism presents a useful interpretation of truth through the justified true belief. A normative perception of the justified true belief is that is a given preposition is true, and a given individual is justified in believing this preposition to be true, then the individual “knows”. The Gettier problem, which questions whether or not a piece of information that is coincidentally truthful, but an individual believes this to be truthful through invalid reasons, still exists as truthful, is therefore solved by this. In the broader context of modern-day philosophy, however, this definition of truth through idealism is relatively useless—how do we define whether something is true?

  Disambiguation in truth, or “absolute truth”, is relatively impossible. In the world of Toni Morrison, it is most applicable to hybridize epistemological idealism with social constructivism (that ‘truth’ is a human construct) to produce idealist deconstructionism. Deconstructionism asserts the definition of words to be contingent on their context. It is far too syllogistic to associate words directly with absolute truth provided by denotation. Therefore, deconstructionism argues for interpretive meaning. The severe limitations of this theory is an implied definition of ambiguous truth. If a word is to be circumscribed to only its “correct” uses, which is intrinsically subjective, does this not limit the variation in truth? and if so, does deconstructionism not simply present a word of multiple truths that is not infinite? A general critique would therefore associate deconstructionism with flexible foundationalism; however, I argue deconstructionism to be a reification of epistemological idealism, in that the “ideas” of words are circumscribed within the boundaries of reality. Truth, therefore, is a diluted version of this idea, leading to a continuous, contemporary version of The Allegory of the Cave. Platonic form of these ideas are not mutually exclusive.  (This belief system is primarily meant to be applied in societies that establish a communication method that includes written or spoken aspects; although gestural or “silent” societies may not call for deconstructionism, this does not devoid the theory.)

In Response to the Liar Paradox (Definition of Truth)

   Similar to a deontological perspective, idealist deconstructionism behaves somewhat in universal truths hybridized with higher-order ideas. The liar paradox would therefore be solved in that a lie is being represented as a diluted truth of having lied. Truth is therefore defined as an esoteric purity that exists in multiplicity contingent on context; for instance, the word “heart” possesses a platonic form in both the self, love, and anatomy. Although there are more definitions available, idealist deconstructionism evades infinite regression through possessing not a foundationalist coherency, but a set, weighted value. Reality is then diversified by the imbalance of light and weight of a word dependent on context; truth exists as a reverse prism: a continuous value of wavelengths streams into a prism to produce a singular beam. The probability of any given wavelength is then defined by context, and typical denotations can be inferred as the highest probable interpretation. 

3 comments:

  1. This is a very thorough, well-written blog post. I found it really interesting and informative in how you presented and described the different perspectives or ideas of postmodernism. I like how you talked about epistemological idealism and social constructivism in relation to Toni Morrison's "world", but I'm curious as to how specific parts of the novel Beloved play into that. How do the characters, setting, and events in the novel express or demonstrate these perspectives/ideas?

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    1. I should have clarified this. This post is to establish my philosophy (I have edited the post to make that more clear), not to discuss the novel. Thank you for your feedback. Your questions will be answered when I post later today!

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  2. I first heard of your blogpost a couple of days ago from a young Sinai, and I could not wait to read it. Now that I had a chance, it has rendered me speechless. I think it is fascinating to read your many takes on Beloved! Très Bien!

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